We follow the path initiated in Shapley (1971) and study the geometry of the core of convex and strictly convex games. We define what we call face games and use them to study the combinatorial complexity of the core of a strictly convex game. Remarkably, we present a picture that summarizes our results with the aid of Pascal's triangle.
Preliminaries
A cooperative n-player game with transferable utility, shortly, a TU game, is a pair (N, v) , where N is a finite set and v : 2 N → R is a function assigning, to each coalition S ∈ 2 N , its worth v(S); by convention v(∅) := 0. Let G n be the set of n-player games. Given S ⊆ N , let |S| be the number of players in S. For the sake of notation, we denote {i} by i.
Let (N, v) ∈ G n . The core (Gillies, 1953) , is defined by C(N, v) := {x ∈ R n : i∈N x i = v(N ) and, for each S ⊆ N, i∈S x i ≥ v(S)}. Let BG n be the set of n-player games with nonempty core. We say C(N, v) is full dimensional if it has dimension n − 1.
Let S ⊆ N and let Π(S) be the set of orderings (permutations) of the elements in S. For each σ S ∈ Π(S) and each i ∈ S, σ S (i) denotes i's position. We denote σ N by σ. For each i ∈ N and each σ ∈ Π(N ), let P σ (i) := {j ∈ N : σ(j) < σ(i)} be the set of predecessors of i with respect to σ. Let (N, v) ∈ G n and σ ∈ Π(N ). The marginal vector associated with (N, v) and σ, m σ (N, v), is defined, for each i ∈ N , by m
A game (N, v) is convex if, for each i ∈ N and each S and T such that
n be the set of n-player convex games. A game (N, v) is strictly convex if, for each i ∈ N and each S and T such that
A (convex) polytope P is the convex hull of a finite set of points. A polytope P is an m-polytope if its dimension is m. A hyperplane H is a supporting hyperplane for P if H ∩ P = ∅ and the halfspace below H contains P . A face of a polytope P is defined as (i) P itself, (ii) the empty set, or (iii) the intersection of P with some supporting hyperplane; faces of dimension m are called m-faces (with the convention that dim(∅) = −1). The 0-faces, 1-faces, and (m − 1)-faces of an m-polytope P are respectively its vertices, edges, and facets. Let F(P ) denote the set of all faces of P .
Core Complexity and Pascal's Triangle
We discuss now the geometry of the cores of convex and strictly convex games. In our exposition we mainly use the terminology in Shapley (1971) and, also, some of the results included there. Let (N, v) ∈ BG n . For each ∅ = T ⊆ N , let H T be the hyperplane
1 Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) showed that a game is convex if and only if the vertices of the core are the marginal vectors, i.e., C(N, v) = co{m σ (N, v) : σ ∈ Π(N )}, where co(A) denotes the convex hull of A. Thus, for convex games, each F T is a nonempty face of C(N, v) and we refer to F T as a T -face of C(N, v). By definition, in each allocation in F T , coalition T receives v(N ) − v(N \T ). Clearly, for each ∅ = T N , since both F T and F N \T lie in H N , they are parallel to each other. Now we define, for each coalition T ⊆ N , a game (N, v FT ) that is closely related to F T .
The idea of the definition is the following. Given a convex game (N, v) and a face F T of its core, if we restrict attention to C(N, v), then the allocations in F T are the best ones for T and the worst ones for N \T . Coalition T always receives v(N ) − v(N \T ) and coalition N \T gets v(N \T ). Yet, there is still freedom for v(N ) − v(N \T ) to be shared among the players in T and for v(N \T ) to be shared among the ones in N \T . Next definition captures this idea.
, the worths of coalitions T and
and letσ ∈ Π(N ) be such that it induces the orders σ T and σ N \T in T and N \T , respectively. Then,
. Suppose that i ∈ T . In this case, N \T ⊆ P σ (i) and it is easy to check that, again,
(ii) Ifσ = (σ N \T , σ T ) the result is trivial. Letσ = (σ N \T , σ T ). Then,σ can be written as (σ R1 , σ T1 , σ R2 , σ T2 , . . . , σ Rp , σ Tq ), where T 1 , . . . , T q ⊂ T , R 1 , . . . , R p ⊂ N \T , and T 1 and R 2 are nonempty. Let σ * := (σ R1 , σ R2 , σ T1 , σ T2 , . . . , σ Rp , σ Tq ), i.e., R 2 and T 1 are swapped. We show that mσ(N, v FT ) = m σ * (N, v FT ). Once the latter is proved, we get, after a finite
Clearly, the marginal vectors associated withσ and σ * can only differ for the players in T 1 or R 2 . We distinguish two cases. Case 1:
, and (N, v) is convex, the desired inequality holds.
(iv) Since v ∈ CG n , m σ (N, v) ∈ F T and the necessity is trivial. We prove the sufficiency. Since mσ(N, v) ∈ F T , then i∈T mσ i = v(N ) − v(N \T ) = i∈T m σ i . By convexity, for each i ∈ T , mσ i (N, v) ≤ m σ i (N, v) and, since i∈T mσ i = i∈T m σ i , we have that, for each i ∈ T ,
by Lemma 1 (ii) and (iii), C(N, v FT ) ⊆ F T and, by Lemma 1 (ii) and (iv), F T ⊆ C(N, v FT ).
The following result is a compilation of different results in Shapley (1971) . (ii) C(N, v) is full dimensional and has 2 n − 2 facets, one for each ∅ = T N .
(iii) Let ∅ = T N . Then, m σ (N, v) ∈ F T if and only if σ is of the form (σ N \T , σ T ).
Remark. From the previous result, for each strictly convex game and each ∅ = T N , F T is a facet of C (N, v) , i.e., an (n − 2)-polytope. Moreover, (i) and (iii) imply that F T has |T |! (n − |T |)! vertices and, hence, (N, v FT ) is not strictly convex. Recall that, for each t ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the number of t-player coalitions is n t . Hence, n t is also the number of faces of C(N, v) that are associated with a coalition of size t. Now, we introduce one more concept from Shapley (1971) . Let P = {N 1 , . . . , N p } be a partition of N , with p ≥ 2. The game (N, v) is decomposable with respect to P if, for each
That is, v is the addition of p smaller games; each of them is referred to as a component. The following result is also a compilation of different results in Shapley (1971) .
Lemma 3. (i) A strictly convex game is indecomposable.
(ii) A decomposable game is convex if and only if each component is convex.
(iii) The core of a decomposable convex game is the cartesian product of the cores of the components of any decomposition.
Proposition 2. Let (N, v) ∈ BG n and ∅ = T N . Then, the game (N, v FT ) is decomposable with respect to P = {T, N \T }.
Let (T, v
T ) and (N \T, v N \T ) denote the two components of the decomposition in Proposition 2. Next result is now completely straightforward. We move now to core complexity. Two polytopes P and P ′ are combinatorially equivalent if there is a one-to-one map f : F(P ) → F(P ′ ) that is inclusion preserving, i.e., F ⊆ F ′ if and only if f (F ) ⊆ f (F ′ ). We define the combinatorial complexity of the core of a game as the number of different equivalence classes there are among its facets according to the above relation. Given a strictly convex game and a coalition ∅ = T N , all the |T |-faces are combinatorially equivalent and, moreover, the faces F T and F N \T are also combinatorially equivalent. Let ⌊·⌋ be the floor function, i.e., for each r ∈ R, ⌊r⌋ denotes the largest integer not larger than r. The following corollaries are immediate from Lemma 2 and the remark below it.
Corollary 2. Let (N, v) be a strictly convex game. Then, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, C(N, v) has 2 n t combinatorially equivalent facets and each of them can be decomposed as the cartesian product of the cores of two strictly convex games with t and n − t players, respectively.
Corollary 3. Let (N, v) and (N, w) be two strictly convex games. Then, C(N, v) and C(N, w) are combinatorially equivalent. Indeed, given t ∈ {0, . . . , n}, for each T, S ⊆ N such that |T | = |S| = t, C(N, v FT ) and C(N, w FS ) are combinatorially equivalent.
Corollary 4. Let (N, v) be a strictly convex game. Then, the combinatorial complexity of
In Figure 1 we illustrate, with the aid of Pascal's triangle, the above corollaries. Given n, below n 0 and n n , we draw the F ∅ and F N faces, i.e., C (N, v) . Then, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, the polytope below n t represents one of the n t combinatorially equivalent T -facets (with |T | = t) of C(N, v) and, since F T = C(N, v FT ), it also represents the cores of the T -face games. Remarkably, Figure 1 contains a lot of information about the geometry of the cores of strictly convex games and, moreover, does it in a noteworthy visual way. we depict the core of an n-player strictly convex game. The core of any other n-player strictly convex game being combinatorially equivalent to it (Corollary 3).
• For each n and each t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, below each n t we depict one of the n t combinatorially equivalent T -facets (with |T | = t) of C(N, v) (Corollary 2).
• For each n and each t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, the facets below n t and n n−t are also combinatorially equivalent to each other (Corollary 2).
• Differently form Pascal's triangle, for each n and each t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, the facets below . Instead, they are the product of two cores: the one below t t and the one below n−t n−t (Corollary 1). For n ≤ 5, this products are represented in the three lines below the triangle.
• Finally, Corollary 4 is readily verified from the picture.
